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HTS Background: Operational Need
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Background: Operational Need
The operational need for socio-cultural support to military operations and
Human Terrain Teams was established in 2006 & 2007 through a series of related
events and actions that documented and validated the operational need for HTS
capabilities.
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Operational Needs Statements: The first requirement was a 2005
Operational Needs Statement (ONS) from 10th Mountain Division in Afghanistan. In
2006 and early 2007, multiple Army and Marine commanders, representing units in
or preparing to support the surge in Iraq, submitted a series of ONS and JUONS
requests..
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JIEDDO Approval & Funding: In 2006, Joint Improvised Explosive Devise
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) validated the operational need and funded an HTS
Proof of Concept. JIEDDO provided funding as a counter-IED initiative. Research
indicated that many IED attacks were generated as a result of actions that
violated socio-cultural mores and required violent retribution. Socio-cultural
understanding was believed to provide a tool to help shape military operations
and avoid cultural conflict that spurred violent reaction.
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CENTCOM JUONS: Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS)
were signed by Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) and Combined Joint Task Force
82 (Afghanistan). The Afghanistan and Iraq JUONS were subsequently consolidated
by CENTCOM. The CENTCOM JUONS established the requirement for a Human Terrain
Team (HTT) at all brigade combat teams (BCTs) / regimental combat teams (RCT)
and a Human Terrain Analysis Team (HTAT) at Division / MEF level in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. The JUONS also authorized the development of supporting project
elements, such as the MAP-HT Toolkit and reach-back capability. The JRAC
validated and funded the JUONS.
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Operational Gaps: The socio-cultural operational gaps driving the
urgent operational need were documented, and identified as:
- Insufficient understanding of the target area culture and its impact on
operational decisions; and insufficient or ineffective transfer of knowledge to
follow-on units via Relief in Place / Transition of Authority (RIP/TOA) process.
- Limited Joint, Service, or Interagency capability (organization, methods, and
tools) to conduct research, visualize, understand, and explain the human terrain
(i.e. population in which the unit operates).
- BCTs, RCTs, and Division-level HQs engaged in counterinsurgency operations in
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom lacked the operationally
relevant human terrain knowledge base and social science staff experts necessary
to optimize their military decision-making process.
- Commanders were limited by the lack of a Joint, Service, and Interagency
integrated capability (people, organization, methods, tools) to effectively
gather/consolidate, analyze, visualize, understand, database, and share
socio-cultural information. The battalions, companies, platoons, and squads,
experienced first hand the knowledge and capability gap.
Commanders at all levels articulated the operational gaps in Iraq and
Afghanistan:
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Limited ability to conduct research, archive, transfer data and information
about human terrain gained during operations
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Limited socio-cultural knowledge bases
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Inability to exploit open source and unclassified cultural information
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Insufficient doctrine/tactics, techniques, and procedures for “denied area
ethnography”
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Limited subject matter expert support to assist commanders to understand human
terrain
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Inability to tap into worldwide cultural knowledge & information
The unclassified version of the Afghanistan JUONS provides a clear example of
the operational gap.
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“US Forces continue to operate in Afghanistan lacking
the required resident and reach-back socio-cultural expertise, understanding,
and advanced automated tools to conduct in-depth collection / consolidation,
visualization, and analysis of the operationally-relevant socio-cultural factors
of the battle space.”
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It also addresses the operational impact of not resolving the deficiencies:
- Continued loss of US Soldiers’ and Marines lives.
- Continued sub-optimization of the Commanders’ ability to assess and analyze the
complex interaction between tribes, and to identify Al Qaida Associated Militant
(AQAM) leaders operating among the population.
- Continued risk of mission failure and unintended second order effects with
strategic consequences.
- Continued cycle of local cultural knowledge loss during unit Relief in Place /
Transition of Authority (RIP/TOA) resulting in needless loss of additional
Soldiers’ and Marines’ lives while the new unit attempts to gain local
situational understanding.
The unclassified version of the Iraq JUONS documented the operational gap noting
that “human terrain knowledge deficiencies” exist at all command echelons. The
Iraq JUONS observed that, “detailed knowledge of host populations is critical in
areas where US forces are being increased to conduct counterinsurgency and
stability operations in Iraq. US forces continue to operate in Iraq without
real-time knowledge of the drivers of the behavior within the host population.
This greatly limits Commanders’ situational awareness and creates greater risks
for forces.”
While processes and organizations exist to assist commanders in visualizing
friendly and enemy forces, no similar system exists to provide understanding of
the local population’s socio-cultural considerations. Commanders have reported
that they lack expert advice on the human terrain aspects of their areas of
operation.
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